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Within existing literature, the vice presidential selection process is considered to be a 
significant decision for presidential nominees but not much is known about the effects 
this selection has on voters. Previous studies treat vice presidential candidates in the 
aggregate and find that vice presidential nominees have a positive influence on 
voters.  This research focuses on presidential elections from 1968 to the most recent 
election of 2008 and is designed to answer the question, do feelings towards 
individual vice presidential candidates influence voters’ decisions when voting in the 
general election? Throughout the past forty years, I find that the 1980, 1988, 2000, 
and 2008 presidential elections were all examples of elections in which one vice 
presidential candidate was a significant influence on voters while the same was not 
true for their counterpart.  When treated as a combined variable in each of these 
elections, the vice presidents were both considered influential.  I show these former 
conclusions are misleading.  Additionally, I employ post estimation techniques to 
graphically display the influence of individual candidates from the 1984, 1992, and 
2008 elections to show the variability amongst influential candidates.  Future studies 
on the influence of vice presidential candidates should be mindful of the variations 







 The 2008 election serves as a good starting point to begin to study the 
influence of vice presidential nominees on voters.  Following a hard fought primary 
season, Barrack Obama eventually emerged as the Democratic Party’s frontrunner, 
and joined John McCain in the race for the presidency.  Soon each campaign began 
the vetting process to select a vice presidential running mate who could boost the 
electability of the party’s tickets.  While Obama settled on long-time Senator Joe 
Biden to add experience to the Democratic Party ticket, John McCain caught 
Americans off guard when he selected the little known, albeit popular, Governor from 
Alaska.   
It was at this point that Sarah Palin was catapulted onto the national political 
scene. Although McCain had won the nomination, many conservative Republicans 
were not satisfied with the selection.  Palin seemed to invigorate the Republican base 
and add new life to the ticket.  She soon joined John McCain on the campaign trail 
and her attendance at campaign rallies drew far larger crowds than before.  She 
became a household name, blanketed the covers of magazines, swooned Saturday 
Night Live watchers, and generally brought a new curiosity to the once stagnant 
Republican ticket.  Unfortunately for Republicans, her addition did not only bring 
positive attention throughout the campaign.  After the honeymoon period seemed 
over, Palin had a string of embarrassing interviews.  It soon became evident that her 
family values rhetoric was contradicted by the reality that her teen daughter was 
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pregnant.  Similarly, Palin’s maverick-like reformist persona was challenged when an 
abuse of power scandal involving the firing of her ex-brother-in-law surfaced.  
Regardless of the positive or negative press she received, it was undeniable that she 
received a great deal of media attention as the Republican vice presidential nominee.       
On the other hand, the Democratic Party’s vice presidential nominee seemed 
to be overshadowed by his less experienced presidential running mate and in relation 
to the attention his Republican counterpart received.  Professionally, Biden was one 
of the Senate’s most senior members.  His chairmanships on the Senate Foreign 
Relations and Judiciary Committees garnered respect, and he provided the Democrats 
with the experience Obama was criticized for lacking.  Unfortunately for Democrats 
many of his accomplishments were overlooked by the media, and he was perhaps best 
known for his verbal missteps.  A record 70 million viewers tuned in to watch the 
vice presidential debate between the nominees in part to see if Palin could appear 
informed on the issues and in part to see if Biden could refrain from being 
condescending, patriarchal, and long-winded.         
Considering this modern example of vice presidential selections, it is 
interesting to discover the office of the vice president is often overlooked within 
political studies.   Within existing literature, the vice presidential selection process is 
considered to be a significant decision for presidential nominees but not much is 
known about the effects this selection has on voters (Nelson 1988).  Only a few 
studies exist that show the influence of vice presidential candidates on voters 
(Wattenberg 1984, 1995; Romero 2001).  Wattenberg (1995) examined the combined 
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influence of vice presidential candidates on voters in the elections spanning from 
1968 to 1994, but failed to recognize the potential differences amongst candidates as 
we see illustrated in the 2008 election.  One could argue, then, a suitable model to 
evaluate the influence of vice presidential candidates has yet to be constructed.  I 
contend that through focusing on a considerably larger scope of time than previous 
studies, from the 1968 election through the election of 2008, and also treating each 
vice presidential candidate as a separate unit of analysis, a more appropriate depiction 
of the influence of vice presidential candidates will arise.  Through this 
demonstration, I show previous evidence was misleadingly supportive of vice 
presidential influence and in certain cases allowed vice presidential candidates to 
appear influential when they were insignificant in the eyes of voters.   
Historical Context 
First, however, it is important to understand the history and evolution of the 
office of the vice presidency and the selection process by which they are chosen. By 
Constitutional design, the official role of the vice president is perhaps most accurately 
described as a waiting game.  Once elected, the vice president is granted the duty of 
presiding over the Senate.  Within this responsibility lie two official tasks.  First the 
vice president must wait until there is a tie so he can break it, and secondly he is 
obligated to announce the Electoral College results for presidential elections every 
four years.  The later role contains the potential to become extremely awkward.  This 
was the case most recently following the 2000 election.   Here the sitting vice 
president and presidential hopeful Al Gore was obligated to declare George W. Bush 
7 
 
as the winner of the hotly contested race for the presidency.  In addition to the vice 
presidential roles within the legislative branch, he also has a very important role 
within the executive office. If something occurred that left the president unable to 
fulfill his duties, the vice president would occupy the presidency.  Interestingly 
enough, it was not until the ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1967 that 
a vacant vice presidential post would be filled if the vice president was required to 
move into the presidency.  Before this passage, the office of the vice presidency was 
left open for a total of 46 years following various presidential successions.     
While the Constitution falls just short of overlooking the vice presidency 
altogether, the vague description of the position also left room for its role to evolve 
overtime.  This occurred through formal institutional changes, such as the 12
th
 
Amendment, and through the power and roles granted in campaigns and once elected.  
Although the office traditionally garnered very little respect, including more often 
than not from its inhabitants, within the modern era the role of the vice president grew 
exponentially.   
However what is still unclear is what role vice presidential candidates play in 
the decisions of voters.  As the position begins to play a more crucial role within the 
Executive Branch, does this translate to attention being drawn to the importance of 
the vice presidential candidates in the minds of voters?  This research focuses on 
presidential elections from 1968 to the most recent election of 2008 and is designed to 
answer the question, do feelings towards vice presidential candidates influence voters 
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when voting in the general election? First I will begin by describing the historical 
evolution of the vice presidential selection process.       
 
Selection Process  
 
When designing our nation’s government, the framers included a plan for the 
selection of the president and vice president.  Originally, the Constitution stated the 
Electoral College must vote for two people, one which cannot be from the same state 
as the elector.  In order to encourage the electors to not simply vote for their state’s 
favorite son candidate and also cast a vote for a ‘throw away’ candidate to ensure a 
win, the framers created the office of the vice president.  According to Hamilton’s 
ideas shared in the Federalist Papers #68, this should have produced two strong 
candidates, one winning the presidency and one competent enough to take over the 
nation if the president was no longer able to serve the country (Hamilton 1999).  This 
was an effective strategy at first, with John Adams serving during George 
Washington’s terms in office until Adams won the presidency in 1796.  Following 
these events, Thomas Jefferson served under John Adams before gaining the 
Presidency himself in 1800.   (Baumgartner 2006).  Soon however, this trend of 
creating logical tickets ceased.  
Shortly after the Constitution was ratified and the new national government 
began to function, politicians of the day found it necessary to form political parties.  
Parties allowed them to create coalitions of people with shared policy preferences to 
help overcome the problem of collective policymaking and allow the government to 
function more efficiently (Aldrich1995).  Hamilton’s original intent with regards to 
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separately electing a qualified vice president to serve soon became obsolete. In the 
1796 election, the ideologically incompatible pairing of Democrat-Republican 
Thomas Jefferson who was elected as the vice president for John Adams -- who was a 
Federalist, led to an openly divided executive office.  Soon political parties saw it in 
their best interest to ignore the electoral structure outlined in the Constitution.  They 
began endorsing two candidates from their party for the ticket in an effort to avoid 
outright opposition within the executive branch (Baumgartner 2006).   
A second drawback to the original construction of executive selection 
involved the unusually high probability of a tie vote within the Electoral College.  
This was made evident in the disastrous 1800 election which led to a showdown 
between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr.  According to the Constitution a tie was 
to be decided by the House of Representatives (Baumgartner 2006). Within the House 
a heated debate ensued including conniving attacks on Burr from the Federalist Party 
led by Hamilton.  After threats of protests in Washington D.C., a letter writing 
campaign spearheaded by Hamilton against Burr, and thirty-six House ballots within 
a weeklong period, Jefferson was eventually granted the presidency.  This of course 
left Aaron Burr to fill the less prestigious vice presidency.  The controversies ensued 
and tensions continued to flare between these men and their respective parties until its 
climax in 1804.  Burr, upon learning he would not be asked by the party to entertain 
the vice presidency for a second term, and after losing his bid for as governor of New 
York, was embarrassed and enraged.   It was at this point that Vice President Burr 
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challenged Hamilton, his vocal and unapologetic long-time political opponent to a 
pistol duel which ultimately led to Hamilton’s murder (Witcover 1992).           
In order to alleviate these problems, the 12
th
 Amendment was ratified and the 
office of the vice presidency no longer resembled the original intent of the framers.  
Instead it called for electors to place two separate votes, one for whom they wanted to 
serve as president with a separate vote for whom they wanted to serve as vice 
president (Nelson 1988b).  From this point forward, the vice president served at the 
mercy of the president’s ticket, and no longer maintained the autonomy once intended 
(Light 1984).  This also opened the door for political parties to determine whom they 
would endorse for each office and to ultimately control the selection process 
(Baumgartner 2006).    
From the early 1804 and until the mid-1900s, political party leaders chose 
their party’s vice presidential nominee.  During this time, the vice president was 
believed to be rather unimportant; as a result, parties failed to attract strong 
candidates for this secondary position (Nelson 1988a, Sigelman & Wahlbeck 1997).  
A prime example of this was Daniel Webster who was offended the vice presidential 
slot by the Whig Party in 1948 and responded, “I do not propose to be buried until I 
am dead” (Nelson 1988b).  Webster was not alone in his distaste for the position but 
two key institutional changes led to major shifts in the role and perception of the vice 





Institutional Changes in Selection Process 
  The first such change occurred leading into the 1940 presidential election 
when Franklin Delano Roosevelt altered the established party-led tradition of 
selecting the vice president.  Roosevelt muscled his way into choosing a running mate 
by cutting out the controlling role of the party.  Preceding this election, John “Cactus 
Jack” Garner was selected by the Democratic Party to serve as FDR’s right hand man 
for the first two terms of office.  Garner played a key role early on in their first term.  
During this time he used his previously acquired Congressional leadership experience 
to persuade Congress to pass many of the president’s New Deal policies.  However, 
after an enthusiastic reelection by the American people in 1936, the relationship 
between Roosevelt and Garner soon turned sour.  By their second term, Garner was 
not shy and publicly challenged the President.  They disagreed on several issues 
including perhaps most famously FDR’s plan to pack the Supreme Court.       
By the election of 1940, there was no longer a working relationship between 
the two men and Garner did not want to serve in the office that he now claimed, “isn’t 
worth a pitcher of warm piss” (Baumgartner 2006, pg 3).  He even went so far as to 
unsuccessfully attempt to run against FDR in the Democratic Party’s primary 
elections.  In an unprecedented third run for office in 1940, FDR’s own nomination 
was once again strongly secured within the Democratic Party.   At this point, he 
threatened to pull out of the race if he was not allowed autonomy in the decision-
making process for his vice presidential running mate.  The party catered to 
Roosevelt’s demands and Henry Wallace was selected by FDR.  This act forever 
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changed the nomination process, and shifted power from the party into the hands of 
the presidential candidate. (Baumgartner 2006, Nelson 1988a, and Sigelman & 
Wahlbeck 1997).   
The second more formal institutional change which lead to changes in the vice 
presidency and the selection process took place in 1970.  In response to peoples’ 
frustration with the government’s handing of the Vietnam War and the protests that 
ensued at the Democratic Party’s national convention, the McGovern-Fraser 
Commission was instituted by the Democratic Party.   The commission called for a 
number of changes within the Democratic Party in an effort to shift power towards 
the people. Hiller and Kriner (2008) argue, two of these changes were particularly 
influential on the vice presidency.  First this resulted in the dramatic growth in 
primary elections.  Elections gave party voters the opportunity to determine 
presidential candidates, as opposed to waiting until the convention for party delegates 
to choose.  From this point forward, presidential nominees were determined earlier in 
the election season and candidates soon possessed more time to vet potential running 
mates and choose a vice presidential candidate.  Stemming from these reforms, there 
was also a clear movement of power away from party leaders to the candidates 
running for office, or what is now referred to as candidate-centered elections (Hiller 
& Kriner 2008; Mayer 2003; Patterson 1980; Steger 2000; Wattenberg 1995).   
Vice Presidential Eras 
Considering its rich and varied history, the office of the vice presidency is 
most accurately thought of in terms of eras. Within each era it is important to note 
13 
 
that both the process of selection and the role they fulfilled once in office changed.  
Baumgartner (2006) divided the vice presidency into three eras, the traditional, 
transitional, and modern.  The traditional era began in 1804 following the ratification 
of the 12
th
 Amendment and ended in 1896.  This earlier era formed many of the 
stereotypes about the office that remain in place to this day.  Generally the candidates 
were chosen less for their intellect and talents and more for their potential electoral 
benefits.  The idea of ticket balancing, which still exists today, sprang from this era.   
Often selections were attributed to an electoral desire to produce an attractively 
balanced ticket.  For instance during this earliest era, ninety percent of all party 
tickets featured vice presidential and presidential pairings from different regions 
(Baumgartner, 2006).  Balanced tickets are likely to appeal to a wider array of voters 
and vice presidents are strategically chosen to boost the presidential ticket’s 
electability (Sigelman & Walhbeck 1997; Baumgartner 2006; Witcover 1992; Light 
1984).   
 Ticket balancing can entail any number of characteristics to balance between 
the running mates.  First, it has been found that presidents may choose to balance 
their ticket based on region.  For example a Southern presidential candidate may 
choose a nominee from New England as a running mate to spread the ticket’s appeal 
to areas the presidential candidate may normally struggle (Rosenstone 1983).  This 
stems from the idea that people like to vote for their state or regional’s ‘favorite son’.  
Parties and Presidents choose to balance tickets on personal qualities including age, 
gender, religion, ideological alignment, and experiences amongst others.  For 
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example if the presidential hopeful had state level executive experience, but lacked 
experience in at the federal level government, he may seek a running mate who was a 
long-term Senator with many connections within Washington (Baumgartner 2006; 
Nelson 1988b; Siegelman & Wahlbeck 1997).    
These ticket balancing strategies encouraged the idea that vice presidential 
running mates influence voter behavior.  As a result, during this era vice presidential 
officeholders were quite often dropped from the ticket before their second term in 
order for their party to adapt to the political environment and recruit a running mate 
that could mobilize the most voters (Baumgartner 2006).  This practice furthered the 
difficulties associated with finding quality candidates as “the prospect of spending 
four years presiding over the Senate, only to be replaced at the end of the term, 
dissuaded most talented political leaders from accepting vice presidential nominations 
in the first place” (Nelson 1988, p. 859).   
Vice president’s role in the Senate was weak at best during the traditional era 
(Baumgartner 2006).  While Congress played a powerful role during this era (Cooper, 
2008), it was not willing to grant power to the presiding officer of the Senate.  
According to Stewart (2001, p. 95) this distrust between the Senate and the vice 
president was justified given that vice presidents “do not face the same electoral 
imperatives as senators, and there is no guarantee that the vice president will share the 
same political goals as a majority of the Senate.”  Vice presidents were also not 
necessarily bound to act in the president’s best interests when presiding over the 
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Senate, because they were not indebted to the president but to the party (Baumgartner 
2006).   
Vice presidents retained their constitutionally granted roles during this era, 
although they all had varied opportunities to carry out these roles.  While some 
devoted time and efforts to their role as presiding officer of the Senate, others chose 
to appear when needed to break a tie.  The opportunity to fulfill the referee role varied 
widely across the terms from twenty-eight tie-breaking votes for John Calhoun to 
zero for John Tyler, William King, Andrew Johnson, and Thomas Hendricks 
(Baumgartner 2006).  Throughout a majority of the transitional era the vice president 
was simply deemed irrelevant until a president died. 
Following the traditional era, the transitional era started with Theodore 
Roosevelt in 1900 and ended with Richard Nixon in 1956.  In general during this 
period, a closer relationship between presidents and vice presidents developed and 
vice presidents’ duties within the office grew succinctly with their loyalties to the 
president.  For example, in the election of 1900, Theodore Roosevelt broke the 
tradition of a vice presidential running mate campaigning solely in his home state or 
possibly region, to campaigning across the nation (Baumgartner 2006).  By the 
modern era, this practice was already commonplace.   
As the president’s power over the selection process grew, so too did his level 
of responsibility and ownership over who filled the second slot.  It was no longer 
common place for vice presidents to be let go after one term. As was mentioned 
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earlier, Garner was the only instance of a vice president leaving the party’s ticket 
during the transitional era although he already served two terms with FDR before he 
was removed.   Only in this extreme case of insubordination, not to mention 
confidence in the president, did a president deem it necessary to overcome the 
potential stigma of appearing weak by dropping his running mate for a second term 
(Baumgartner 2006). 
Although the transitional era vice president was needed less often to break 
Senate ties than in the traditional era -- they averaged approximately 3.5 tie breaks 
per vice president compared to 7.5 for the traditional era -- their informal roles grew.  
While the legislative function of the vice president shrank, his role within the 
executive increased.   For the first time, transitional vice presidents regularly attended 
cabinet meetings, some were granted policy issues to spearhead, the office of the vice 
president received its own seal, and presidential successions went far more smoothly 
than they did during the traditional era.  Vice presidents were also used by the 
president as a policy activist to influence Congress, the public, and other nations.  As 
the position gained new responsibilities, the prestige of the position increased.  While 
the vice presidency of the traditional era was stigmatized as a dead end, this was no 
longer the case for some transitional vice presidents.  Following their terms, 
transitional era vice presidents became presidents, Senators, Chief Justices, and 
secretaries (Baumgartner 2006). A more prestigious and respected institution started 
to emerge during the transitional era, although its established image as a trivial 
position was not easily disposed.  
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Modern vice presidents, those who held office from the 1960’s to the present 
day, are now considered key players within the executive branch.  They are granted a 
great number of resources including an office in the White House, an additional office 
separate from the president along with a bustling staff of approximately seventy, a 
home in Washington D. C., and a separate budget to help them carry out their various 
responsibilities and duties.  This is in stark contrast to early vice presidents. Earlier 
vice presidents were often better known for their drunkenness, absent nature, and 
incompetence than for possessing any shred of power and influence over 
governmental affairs (Light 1984; Nelson 1988a & b; Baumgartner 2006).  Perhaps 
the most amusing example includes Martin Van Buren’s vice president, Richard 
Johnson, who left Washington D.C. to go back to Kentucky to run a tavern 
(Baumgartner 2006). Needless to say as the level of prestige within the office of the 
vice president grew the presidential candidate’s were able to entice stronger running 
mates. 
 The role of vice presidential candidates expanded significantly to the 
campaign season as well.  During the traditional and transitional eras, vice presidents 
rarely actively campaigned for their ticket.  If they did campaign, it was usually 
limited to their home state with the exception of Theodore Roosevelt (Baumgartner 
2006).  Even as recently as the 1980s Goldstein (1982) argued that the vice 
presidential nominee gained very little media attention.  Light (1984) stated that even 
though at that time the media did not place a lot of attention on the vice presidential 
candidate, the prospective presidents gave  a great deal of attention to their choices.  
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For example President Nixon kept extensive records of his carefully calculated 
selection process including poll results of how he would fair in the election if he had 
each of the shortlisted candidates on his ticket.  Baumgartner (2006) claims the media 
is now catching up with presidential campaigns, placing an increasing amount of 
focus on the vice presidential selection including who the presidential candidate could 
have on his shortlist of possible vice presidential picks and when he might 
strategically announce his choice.   
 One reason for this growing fascination is that the modern primary season 
continues to frontload.  As states move primary election days earlier in the season, the 
general election remains unchanged. This produces a large gap between the time 
when the political parties have decided the ticket and the party’s convention.  In 
search of something campaign related to cover this lull, media speculation grows 
concerning who might be chosen as vice president.  Presidential candidates also take 
advantage by wisely choosing when to make their official announcement so as to 
maximize the attention they receive for their choice and boost enthusiasm going into 
their party’s convention (Lichert & Lichert 2004; Baumgartner 2006).   
Existing Research 
 There is some literature available on the reasoning behind vice presidential 
selections from the perspectives of the presidential candidates and their advisors.    
Presidential campaigns expend significant resources and effort into choosing a 
running mate.   The explanations and details on the process from those directly 
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involved in the choice are accounted for in historical documentation and presidential 
biographies (Kearns 1976; Goldstein 1982; Witcover 1992).  Additionally Sigelman 
and Wahlbeck (1997) studied the strategies used to boost the electability of 
presidential tickets from 1940 to1996.  They found that although balancing age 
groups, as we witnessed by both tickets in the 2008 election, and selecting a running 
mate from “a state that can make a difference when the electoral votes are counted” 
were often practiced, many of the traditional ticket balancing techniques are not 
implemented (pg 862).  This research shows that much of what is still believed to be 
true concerning the vice presidency is often based on what is known about previous 
vice presidential eras and is outdated. 
 Most importantly, these studies fail to address one very key element to the 
vice presidential choice.  While they focus on the electoral strategy behind the choice 
made by the presidential hopeful, they do not concentrate on whether or not vice 
presidential candidates are likely to impact the decisions of voters.  There is a large 
amount of speculative information on the effect of certain candidates.  This especially 
applies those who were more controversial picks such as Vice President Dan Quayle, 
who was seen as a detriment to the Republican Party ticket in 1988 and 1992 
(Witcover 1992).  However, these studies fail to empirically address the electoral 
effectiveness of the strategies used to pick running mates.     
 In the past, a handful of researchers examined the influence vice presidential 
candidates’ evaluations have on presidential elections.  However, these results are not 
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consistent due to very different modeling approaches, some opting to advance their 
studies from the individual level (Wattenberg 1984, 1995) and others at the aggregate 
level (Dudley and Rapoport 1989, Holbrook 1991, Romero 2001).  For instance, 
Dudley and Rapoport (1989) discovered the tactic of adding a vice-presidential 
candidate to the ticket in order to gain a home state advantage was not an effective 
strategy.  Through studying a one hundred year period from 1884 to 1984, they found 
that the home state advantage, one of the key points within the ticket balancing 
approach, hardly exists.  For example they estimate that within a vice-presidential 
candidate’s home state one can on average expect to see a modest 0.3 percent 
increase in voting for their favorite son’s ticket; and while slightly higher for small 
states, it is on average slightly lower for larger more enticing states (Dudley and 
Rapoport 1989).  Considering the ideas shared earlier on vice presidential eras, the 
differences amongst candidates, and the idea that the vice presidency has gained 
respect, responsibilities, and exposure overtime, it is unfair to pool one hundred years 
of elections and treat them all equally.  Perhaps a more accurate approach would be to 
examine each era individually and then compare time period differences.   
 When examining the influence of vice-presidential candidates on individual 
voters, the results begin to look more promising; however, they are not entirely 
agreeable.  To begin, Romero (2005) conducted research on the 1976 election 
examining the influence of presidential and vice presidential candidates on individual 
voters.  He provided a control for the varied familiarity between vice presidential 
candidates and presidential candidates.  He accomplished this by including a measure 
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that is “related to the voter’s evaluations but independent of his or her vote” by using 
questions from the 1974 survey, such as one’s approval of Ford’s pardoning of 
Nixon, and relating those responses to votes cast for president in the 1976 election 
(Romero 2005, pg 458).  While he was able to use this model for the 1976 election, 
not many panel surveys provide this opportunity.  Therefore the applicability of such 
a model is limited.        
In an attempt to move beyond the limitations that case studies provide, 
Wattenberg (1984, 1995) conducted a study on the influence vice-presidential 
candidates have on individual voters, the first focused on elections from 1952 to 1980 
and the second served to update his findings to include elections from 1968 to 1992.  
In the latter study, he focused attention on those voters whom do not feel similarly 
towards both the vice president and president of a given party.  As predicted in such 
cases, a voter’s evaluation towards the vice president takes a back seat to the 
evaluation of the president either leaving him to abandon a vice presidential candidate 
he prefers or to vote for a party’s ticket while forced to elect a person to the 
secondary office he does not support.  Perhaps more importantly, he finds when 
pooling the vice-presidential candidate evaluations from 1968 to 1992, the vice 
president does play a significant role in the decisions of individual voters.  His 
findings from this research are found in Table 1 and will later serve as the cornerstone 
for the model used in this research.  While he utilizes a new approach towards 
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crossing over into different eras by sticking solely to the modern era, one of the short 
comings lies pooling the data.   
Arguably each electoral environment within this period was not created 
equally and experienced very different circumstances and political actors.  For 
example the election of 1968 was filled with protests, assassinations, and vast 
uncertainty.  On top of these factors, it took place before the McGovern Fraser 
Commission altered the selection process (Hiller and Kriner 2008).  Voters even 
indicated they preferred the Democratic Party’s vice presidential candidate, Sen. 
Muskie, to Spiro Agnew which perhaps spoke to the American people’s forsight as 
Agnew would later be forced to resign from the office of the vice presidency.  
Watergate, which greatly damaged the reputation of the office of the presidency, in 
part led to the 1976 election of a refreshingly unknown team, Governor Carter and 
Senator Mondale.  Mondale later ran for the presidency in 1984.  This was the first 
time a woman, Geraldine Ferraro, was invited to join the ticket.  Therefore not only is 
each election distinctive, but each candidate is also unique within each election.  For 
example Ferraro, who found herself on the losing ticket in the 1984 election, polled 
higher than the sitting Vice President George H.W. Bush. It is thus not appropriate to 
pool several elections, treat each vice presidential candidate as equal, and then claim 
to have an accurate portrayal of vice presidential influence on individual voters.   It is 
for this reason that the current study treats each election and each vice presidential 
candidate as a unique occurrence.  In the end, these empirical results present a richer 




 In the past, it was widely accepted that individuals vote for the president and 
do not place a great deal of weight on the vice presidential running mate.  
Baumgartner (2006) also raises the point that many believe a vice presidential 
running mate must be chosen carefully, in order to maximize and not damage the 
party’s appeal.    This raises the question, does the vice presidential running mate 
impact the electoral choices of voters? Although the previous studies discussed earlier 
argue that vice presidential candidates are influential on voters, I argue that their 
methodological approach is inappropriate, and it is potentially misleading to treat vice 
presidential candidates as anything but individual units of analysis.  I believe past 
research combining the influence of vice presidential candidates both across elections 
and within the same election year could yield deceptive conclusions.  Thus the 
question of whether vice presidents influence voters has not been adequately 
answered.  In an effort to present an alternative methodology, I first establish whether 
each individual candidate has a significant influence on voters during the given 
election year.  Additionally, I employ post estimation techniques to graphically 
display the influence individual vice presidential satisfaction rankings have on voters 
for vice presidential candidates that were especially distinctive.       
Research Methodology 
 Aligned with Wattenberg’s (1995) study covering elections between 1968 and 
1994, I examine modern presidential elections from these same years but do not 
aggregate and pool the data.  I then update to the 2008 election and examine the 
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subsequent elections.  Again, each election is treated separately, and I measure the 
influence of an individual’s feelings toward vice presidential candidates on the 
dependent variable, vote choice of the individual.  Vote choice is treated as a 
dichotomous variable, including a vote for the vice presidential nominee’s party ticket 
coded as 0 and a vote for the opposing party coded as 1.  Much like in the Wattenberg 
(1995) study, the key independent variable is one’s evaluation of the vice presidential 
candidates and is measured using a feeling thermometer ranging from 0 to 100.  It is 
also important to control for how the individual rates the presidential candidate 
independently.   
The potential for multicollinearity arises when using presidential and vice 
presidential candidates within the same party.  During the time period studied here, 
there were vast differences in the correlation values between presidents and their 
running mates.  The lowest correlations existed between G.H.W. Bush and Reagan in 
1980 (r = 0.28) and Bentsen and Dukakis in 1988 (r = 0.27).  Correlations seemed to 
have the potential to grow stronger in the case of presidents and vice presidents 
running for a second term.  This was the case with Dick Chenney and George W. 
Bush in 2004 ticket that scored the strong correlational value of 0.70 and Al Gore and 
Bill Clinton’s 1996 ticket where r = 0.68.  In an effort to avoid multicollinearity 
issues that arise in some but not all elections, it is imperative to find a more 
acceptable measure for the presidential evaluations.  Wattenberg (1995) suggested 
measuring this variable in terms of affect towards the presidential candidate.  This is 
constructed through the sum of Democratic presidential ‘likes’ and Republican 
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presidential candidate ‘dislikes’ minus the sum of Democratic presidential candidate 
‘dislikes’ and Republican presidential candidate ‘likes’ when responding to questions 
such as, “Is there anything in particular about (the presidential candidate) that might 
make you want to vote against him?” (ANES CDF).  Unfortunately, this option is not 
available for the 2008 election.  Instead  feelings for both presidential candidates must 
be substituted for the likes and dislikes variable.  However, this should not be a 
concern as the strength of both correlations, between 2008 vice presidential candidate 
feelings and likes and dislikes presidential ranking (r = -0.12) and presidential 
feelings (r = 0.52), range from very weak to moderate.  In addition to controlling for 
one’s ratings of the presidential candidate, it is necessary to also include controls for 
party identification ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican and also 
ideological leanings measured on a scale of 0, most liberal, to 100, most conservative.  
This ensures that any difference in the vote choice of individuals can be attributed to 
a person’s feelings toward the vice president and not one’s enthusiasm, or lack of 
enthusiasm, towards the top member of the ticket or because of any other variable 
controlled for in this study.   
 The American National Election Studies data provides all the needed 
information to conduct this study.  I utilize logistic regression to examine the 
influence of vice presidents on voter’s choice.  In order to more effectively describe 
the relationship between evaluations of vice presidential candidates and voter 
preferences, post-estimation techniques are applied to the significant relationships 
found in the model.    These allow us to compare the predicted probabilities of voting 
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for the vice presidential nominee’s ticket based on one’s feelings toward the different 
vice presidential candidates.    
 
Results 
 The results presented in Table 2 reveal four instances from 1968 to 2008 
where the traditional method of analyzing the influence of vice presidential 
candidates on voters was misleading [Wattenberg’s 1995 results are posted in Table 
1].  This first example occurred in the 1980 election where the Democratic vice 
presidential nominee, Sen. Walter Mondale, did not have a significant influence on 
voters while his Republican counterpart, George H.W. Bush did play a role in voter’s 
decisions.  Although it may not be surprising to most that Mondale was insignificant, 
this does show that when Reagan selected his rival from the primary season, who 
went so far as to coin Reagan’s supply side economics tactics as voodoo economics, 
the choice benefitted him electorally.  The second instance where there is a 
discrepancy with Wattenberg’s (1995) conclusions occurred in the 1988 election.  It 
was here that Dukakis’ choice, Lloyd Benson, did not enter into the minds of voters 
while George H.W. Bush’s selection, Dan Quayle was a significant factor.  The next 
discrepancy took place in the heated 2000 battle for the presidency.  In this case, 
George W. Bush’s Republican running mate, Dick Chenney, failed to influence voters 
while interestingly enough, Al Gore’s choice to fill the position, Joe Lieberman, did 
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influenced voters although Joe Biden was not a contributing factor for voters.  
According to Wattenberg’s methodology these particular elections, along with all of 
the elections from 1968 through 1992, were significantly influenced by the vice 
presidential running mates.  Our new evidence suggests such sweeping conclusions 
are misguided.      
 Another finding worthy of attention is that in all cases when vice presidential 
candidates were influential, they were a positive addition to their party’s ticket.  This 
discovery is worth noting as it directly contradicts the media’s framing and our 
understanding of certain vice presidential selections.  For example in the 1988 
election George H.W. Bush asked a political advisor to draw up a list of 20 possible 
candidates including a handful of candidates added to throw off the media.  
According to Witcover (1992, p. 335) Bush’s selection of the relatively inexperienced 
“Senator Dan Quayle of Indiana – generally regarded as a lightweight and certainly 
one of the decoys” making the list was “fantastic – but not in the way George Bush 
meant”.  In an effort to set himself apart from Reagan’s administration, many felt he 
made a rash and miscalculated decision that hurt his ticket especially considering 
Bush had never formally spoken with Quayle prior to his selection.  Bush also 
received great pressure to remove Quayle from the Republican ticket when running 
for a second term in 1992 (Witcover 1992).  Evidence in Table 2 suggests that 
although it is impossible to know if a different selection would have benefitted 
Bush’s ticket, Quayle did positively influence voters in both elections.     
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In order to gain a stronger understanding of the influence of vice presidential 
candidates on voters, post estimation techniques simulate the predicted probability of 
voting for a party’s ticket based on feelings toward that party’s vice presidential 
candidate while holding all other variables constant.  I concentrate on voters 
indentifying as Independents, as these voters are more likely to be undecided or 
persuadable in comparison to Democrats and Republicans.  I will examine three more 
controversial selections, including Geraldine Ferraro in 1984, Dan Quayle’s second 
selection in 1992, and Sarah Palin in 2008.  First I will start by examining the 1984 
election in which Walter Mondale chose Geraldine Ferraro to serve as the first 
woman on a major party ticket.   
The results in Figure 1 graphically display the influence of each vice 
presidential candidate on voting for their respective ticket amongst Independents in 
1984.  Bush’s influence changes more dramatically amongst Independents who report 
unfavorable feelings toward him.  For example, Independents who report not liking 
Bush at all, ranking him at a zero on the scale of zero to 100, are predicted to vote 
Republican a mere 36%, plus or minus approximately 8%, of the time, yet those who 
ranked him at a more neutral fifty are predicted to vote for his ticket 73%, plus or 
minus 3% of the time.  This is a change in average probability of 37%.  Interestingly 
enough, at Bush’s higher ratings on the feeling thermometer scores, between 51 and 
100, the predicted probability of voting rate of change only increases by 19%; 
however, for this range, he both starts high at an average of 73% (+/- 3%) and 
finishes high at 92% (+/- 2%).   
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         Figure 1: Influence of VP Candidates on Independent Voters in 1984   
 
Note:  Graphic displays the predicted probabilities of Independents voting for each presidential ticket 
in the 1984 election based on their feelings toward the vice presidential candidates of that party.   
Predicted probabilities are estimated with all other continuous variables held at their means.  Dashed 




On the other hand, Geraldine Ferraro appears to increase the likelihood one 
will vote for Mondale at a much slower rate.  While those who most strongly disliked 
Ferraro, rating her a zero, were predicted to vote for Mondale 6% (+/- 2%) of the 
time, those who were neutral towards her, rating her at a 50, were still highly unlikely 
to vote for Mondale, at rates of 19% (+/- 2%).  Surprisingly, even those who reported 
liking Ferraro at the highest level were only predicted to vote for Mondale 44% (+/- 
6%) of the time.  While the logistic regression showed Ferraro positively influenced 
her ticket, her more modest rate of change only ranging 38 total percentage points is 
perhaps more of a reflection on the strength of the Reagan ticket in relation to 
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Mondale’s.  Perhaps there was only so much her unique addition to the Democratic 
presidential ticket could do in an election where Reagan carried 49 out of the 50 
states and won with a convincing 525 Electoral College votes to Mondale’s 
embarrassingly low 13 votes.   
Moving on to the 1992 election, Figure 2 displays the influence of Quayle and 
Gore on voting for George H.W. Bush.  First it is important to note that although the 
sample over all showed that both vice presidential candidates had a positive influence 
on the race, more Independents indicated they felt favorable towards Gore than did 
not, and more Independents felt unfavorable towards Quayle than favorable.   At the 
height of Quayle’s favorability, the highest predicted probability of an Independent 
voting for the Republican ticket is only 69% (+/- 7%) and at his lowest rating the 
predicted probability is a meager 15% (+/- 4%).  Independents who felt impartial to 
Quayle, rating him a fifty, were only predicted to vote for the Republican ticket 40% 
(+/-3) of the time.  Gore experienced almost the same rate of change over time that 
Quayle did over Independents in the 1992 election.  However, Gore’s predicted 
probabilities were considerably higher to start.  Those who disliked Gore the most 
still voted for the Democratic ticket 38% (+/- 9%) of the time.  While those 
Independents who liked him reached their highest levels, most were predicted to vote 





Figure 2: Influence of VP Candidates on Independent Voters in 1992           
 
Note:  Graphic displays the predicted probabilities of Independents voting for each presidential ticket 
in the 1992 election based on their feelings toward the vice presidential candidates of that party.  
Predicted probabilities are estimated with all other continuous variables held at their means.  Dashed 
lines indicate the 95% confidence bounds.  Predicted probabilities estimated using the Zelig software 
package. 
 
The 2008 election was different than the elections discussed earlier.  For 
starters as was the case in forty percent of the elections studied, only one candidate 
was influential on voters’ decisions.  Figure 3 shows the predicted probability for 
Independents of voting for John McCain across the various levels of satisfaction 
towards Sarah Palin.  Although it is evident that as Palin’s likability increases so too 






Figure 3:  Influence of Sarah Palin on Independent Voters in 2008 
 
Note:  Graphic displays the predicted probabilities of Independents voting for the Republican 
presidential ticket in the 2008 election based on their feelings toward the vice presidential candidates.  
Predicted probabilities are estimated with all other continuous variables held at their means.  Dashed 
lines indicate the 95% confidence bounds.  Predicted probabilities estimated using the Zelig software 
package. 
 
appears less dramatic than say Quayle in 1992 or George H.W. Bush in 1980.  On 
average, Independents who responded with the strongest dislike for Palin were only 
predicted to vote Republican roughly 22 percent (+/- 4%) of the time.  On the other 
hand, those reporting the highest levels of satisfaction towards her only increased 
their predicted likelihood of voting Republican by approximately 25%. This modest 
increase is less than half the overall increase George H.W. Bush experienced in 1980.  
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Additionally, the highest estimated predicted probability of Independents voting for 
the Republican ticket rests at Palin’s highest satisfaction rating, but still fails to 
exceed 50%.    
Discussion 
 These results confirm the initial apprehension towards treating both party’s 
vice presidential candidates as one unit across and within elections.  Wattenberg’s 
(1995) methodology, treating elections separately while combining feelings towards 
both vice presidents, misleadingly assumes that in each election vice presidential 
candidates are influential on voters.   These findings, taking into consideration 
historical differences between vice presidential candidates from 1968 to 2008, 
suggest that in 40% of the elections studied, such conclusions are simply inaccurate.  
The graphic displays of the influence of select vice presidential nominees on voters 
further stress the differences amongst candidates. 
These results more accurately depict the wide array of candidates vying for 
the vice presidency.  For example, the 2008 election pitted two very different vice 
presidential candidates against one another.  As an experienced Senator, Joe Biden 
more accurately fit the stereotypical politician description, but was met by a radically 
different Republican counterpart.  Although Sarah Palin was a near unknown before 
her nomination, this did not remain the case for long.  By the election, nearly twice as 
many respondents (615:376) indicated they either had no opinion towards Joe Biden 
or they did not know who he was than responded in this way when asked how they 
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felt towards Sarah Palin.  Arguably Sarah Palin and her family’s media exposure far 
outshined that of the attention Joe Biden received.  Although experienced, it appears 
that Joe Biden was overshadowed by larger personalities within the election, and 
people simply did not see him as a factor.   
 This study does have some limitations.  For instance, the measure for the vice 
presidential candidate used to infer a relationship to voter choice is dependent on a 
feeling thermometer question asking the respondent to rate their feelings toward the 
vice president on a scale of 0 to 100, negatively to positively.  It could be that this 
measure, although consistent across all elections contained within this study, does not 
effectively capture evaluations of vice presidents.   However, with the controls 
considered within the study, including affect towards the presidential selections, and 
the appeal of using such a large secondary data set, this measure still does an 
adequate job of isolating the impression the vice presidential candidate makes on the 
ticket.   
Yet another concern arises when considering the potential for reciprocal 
effects between the evaluations of presidential candidates and the vice presidential 
candidates they chose to join their party’s ticket.  I believe that by reducing the 
correlation between the variables through maintaining different measures for affect 
towards the presidential candidate and satisfaction ratings for the vice presidents with 
the exception of 2008, I have adequately addressed these concerns for the purpose of 
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my study.  I have shown that variation exists across vice presidential candidates with 
regards to their influence on voters.    
Conclusion 
 The vice presidency has evolved over the past two centuries and was shaped 
by the political actors who filled the position throughout the years.  As far back as the 
traditional era, parties and presidential hopefuls made their presidential running mate 
selections based on the idea that if chosen wisely, a good choice will not harm their 
party’s ticket and might actually help them win the election.  While conventional 
wisdom suggests vice presidents either do not have an impact on voters or potentially 
hurt a ticket, previously conducted research suggests vice presidents do influence 
voters.  They also show that vice presidential nominees encourage votes in favor of 
their party over all election years examined.  However this research suggests previous 
methods which combined the influence of both vice presidential candidates and at 
times election years is not an appropriate methodology.  Instead this research supports 
the idea that considering the vast differences in vice presidential candidates over the 
years, not all will be influential if treated individually.     
Throughout the past forty years, I find that the 1980, 1988, 2000, 2008 
presidential elections were all examples of elections in which one vice presidential 
candidate was a significant influence on voters while the same was not true for their 
counterpart.  When treated as a combined unit in each of these elections, the vice 
presidents were both considered influential and these conclusions are misleading.  
When examining the influence of candidates individually, I discover that even within 
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elections when both candidates are influential, their influence on Independents can 
vary dramatically.  Looking back on the 1984 election is a prime example where 
Bush was predicted to help his ticket as a far higher rate than Ferraro was estimated to 
influence Independents.    If these two nominees were treated in the aggregate, these 
differences would be overlooked.  Future studies on the influence of vice presidential 
candidates should be mindful of the variations amongst candidates and should be 





Table 3: Correlation Relationship Between Feelings Toward Vice Presidential and 
Presidential Candidates by Party 
 
Election Year                 Political Party 




Republicans (Agnew & Nixon) 





Republicans (Agnew & Nixon) 





Republicans (Dole & Ford) 
Democrats (Mondale & Carter) 
0.42 
0.43 
1980 Republicans (Bush Sr. & Reagan) 





Republicans (Bush Sr. & Reagan) 





Republicans (Quayle & Bush Sr.) 





Republicans (Quayle & Bush Sr.) 





Republicans (Kemp & Dole) 





Republicans (Chenney & Bush Jr) 





Republicans (Chenney & Bush Jr) 
Democrats (Edwards & Kerry) 
0.69 * 
0.62 * 
2008 Republicans (Palin & McCain) 
Democrats (Biden & Obama) 
0.70* 
0.65* 
Note:   Correlations between 0.0 and 0.19 are considered to have a very weak relationship, 
0.2 and 0.39 a weak relationship, 0.4 to 0.59 a moderate relationship, 0.6 to 0.79 a strong 
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